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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the forensic opportunities afforded by flash memory.  It starts 
with a discussion of flash storage, starting with the physics of flash devices, the 
development of flash translation layers (which allow flash devices to be used with 
unmodified legacy operating systems), and flash file systems (which provide for better 
utilization of flash storage at a somewhat higher cost).  Then this thesis provides a 
comprehension survey of the relevant academic literature and evaluates the work that 
others have done in the field of flash data recovery.  It provides a theory of circumstances 
when residual data may exist on flash memory through the intentional deletion and 
overwrite of previously saved data, based upon a thorough patent review and freely 
available documentation.  It clearly documents the steps of configuring a Linux kernel to 
use the YAFFS2 (Yet Another Flash File System used in Android) and the JFFS2 (the 
Journaling Flash File System used on the One Laptop per Child Program) flash file 
systems.  It then conducts experiments to confirm or deny these theories, with a focus on 
the recovery of data and other evidence that overwritten and deleted data once existed.  
Finally, this thesis makes recommendations for further research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
Small devices using flash-based storage are routinely encountered during military, 
law enforcement and intelligence operations.  Today, these devices are largely analyzed 
using tools designed to analyze hard drives.  These tools look for data at the logical block 
level.  They can find data inadvertently left on the device either because no attempt was 
made to delete it or the attempt was not successful.  Flash devices offer additional 
opportunities for data recovery, because there is a physical layer below the logical layer 
that can be exploited to benefit the forensic investigator.   
This thesis explores the forensic opportunities afforded by flash memory.  It 
begins with a discussion of flash storage starting with the physics of flash devices, the 
development of Flash Translation Layers (FTLs), which allow flash devices to be used 
with unmodified legacy operating systems, and flash file systems (which provide for 
better utilization of flash storage at a somewhat higher cost).  The thesis then makes the 
following contributions to the field of computer forensics: 
 The first comprehensive survey of the academic literature regarding flash 
forensics. 
 A thorough review of FTL, flash file systems and flash memory patents 
with respect to the opportunities for recovering residual data. 
 Clearly documenting the steps for configuring Linux to use YAFFS and 
JFFS2 with a flash simulator. 
 Performing experiments that used a flash simulator and file system 
operations to determine residual data left by YAFFS and JFFS2. 
 Discussing the possibilities for recovering residual data from a FTL. 
 Recommendations for further research.   
These techniques further developed the understanding of how residual data is left on flash 
memory devices and how to recover it. 
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B. THEORY 
Flash is a block structured storage system that is increasingly being used to 
supplement or replace traditional magnetic storage in many applications. Flash is also 
widely used on portable devices such as cellular phones. But flash storage is different 
from magnetic storage in two important ways. First, flash storage blocks must be erased 
before they can be written, and the erasure size is typically much larger than the block or 
sector size. Second, whereas the sectors on a hard drive can be rewritten hundreds of 
millions of times, flash blocks can typically only be rewritten a few thousand times. 
The physical limitations of flash media are overcome with two technical 
approaches: out of place writes when data is changed, and wear leveling that swaps data 
from one physical location to another in order to even the usage of erase operations 
among the flash storage blocks.  This required functionality offers more opportunities for 
a forensic examiner to recover residual data than are afforded on a typical hard disk drive.  
Flash media used in SD cards and in USB thumb drives implement these 
requirements through the flash transition layer (FTL), an indirection layer that allows a 
traditional operating system to read and write individual logical sectors on the flash, but 
which translates these operations to the out-of-place writes and wear-leveling necessary 
for proper operation. As a result of the FTL, the act of overwriting every logical sector of 
a flash storage device may leave observable evidence at the physical layer that the flash 
media has been previously used.  This is because overwriting blocks at the logical level 
will result in changes to the internal FTL data structures that cannot be controlled through 
the traditional APIs used to control block devices. It is also possible that residual user 
data may be recovered through an API that allows access to the physical flash device, 
because the act of overwriting specific logical data does not translate into the erasure and 
overwriting of the corresponding physical blocks. 
The potential for forensic recovery with flash is therefore greater than with a hard 
disk drive. Users of hard drives have full access to the physical layer: the act of wiping 
the entire hard drive and reinstalling a new operating system leaves little or no trace that 
the device had been previously used.  But, if a user were to reinstall a new operating 
 3
system on a flash device in attempt to cover previous use, the data structures are written 
to new physical locations, possibly leaving older ones in place, unmapped to the logical 
layer.  These unmapped, older blocks may contain previous operating system data or user 
files that will provide a signature different from a flash device that was used just once.   
In addition, a flash device used for the first time will most likely result in very 
little fragmentation at the physical layer.  On a clean device, data is written sequentially 
until the media fills.  There is very little wear leveling if the media has not been used 
much.  But, if the flash device has been used extensively in an attempt to wipe at the 
logical layer only, the reinstallation of an operating system will result in a greater level of 
physical fragmentation as the media fills with out of place writes and the FTL or flash file 
system conducts wear leveling procedures. 
This theory is also applicable for use in the potential recovery of previous user 
files that a user attempts to wipe.  But, as the user files grow in size and the use of the 
flash media increases, the files will become more fragmented at the physical layer, 
leaving data recovery operations much more difficult.  Smaller files, particularly the size 
of a physical flash page or smaller (approximately 512KB), should provide the greatest 
potential for recovery.  The ideal targets for recovery would be small text documents, cell 
phone message log entries, contact information, small images and file system data 
structures that contain metadata such as inodes and FATs.  Files that are likely to become 
fragmented and harder to recover include large image files, video files and sound format 
files such as .mp3 and .wav. 
C. FLASH TRANSLATION LAYER 
There are two approaches to address the limitations of flash memory caused by 
write endurance, out of place writes, erase block sizes and NAND flash’s non-random 
addressability.  The first is the Flash Translation Layer specification.  The FTL allows 
any standard file system to utilize a flash memory device by emulating a block device.  
The FTL stands between the host operating system and the flash device and translates the 
standard block commands from the host.  It will present memory from the flash in sectors 
and blocks, much like the standards used by a hard disk drive interacting with a FAT file 
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system, while hiding the intricacies of the flash device, such as block erasing and wear 
leveling.  It does this by mapping the block and sector addresses of the standard file 
system to physical addresses.  So, as data is physically moved to different locations in 
order to implement wear leveling and out-of-band writes, the FTL presents the data to the 
host operating system as if the data is written to a static location.  The FTL may be 
implemented on a hardware controller that exists on the chip itself working as the 
intermediary between a host OS utilizing a standard file system such as FAT or it may 
exist as part of the operating system.  A common example of an implementation is 
SanDisk’s mobile flash drive, which utilizes an FTL programmed on an embedded 
controller within the SanDisk SD memory cards. 
D. FLASH FILE SYSTEMS 
The second approach is to design a file system that implements wear leveling and 
out-of-band writes itself.  Applications such as the open source YAFFS (Yet Another 
Flash File System) and JFFS (Journaling Flash File System) and the proprietary 
Microsoft Flash File System use this approach.  Instead of using the traditional FAT or 
inodes, these systems create their own data structures on the flash device. These data 
structures are loaded into the host computer’s RAM when the flash file system is 
mounted.  These structures are used by the file system to implement wear leveling, bad 
block management, block reclamation during block erasure and pointers to extents that 
will recreate files requested by the host.  Typically, the structure will utilize status flags 
that indicate the state of the physical pages and blocks and erase counts to even wear.  A 
key distinction between FTLs and flash file systems is that the operating system, through 
the flash file system, will have direct access to the spare area to store metadata and file 
structures, whereas the FTL does not give the OS and utilized file systems that level of 
access.  Flash file systems are typically used in embedded applications where the flash 
storage is not removable, such as the YAFFS implementation in the Android operating 
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system for mobile phones [1].1  Unlike the FTL utilizing a FAT, flash file systems are 
not as portable to other systems; specific drivers will need to be loaded onto the host for 
interaction. 
The potential for forensic data recovery will depend upon the specific 
implementation of the wear leveling mechanism.  Each specification will handle wear 
leveling differently and will perform garbage collection at different intervals.  One 
solution will not fit all, and each system needs to be studied carefully to maximize data 
recovery. 
 
1 The T-Mobile G1 phone, which uses the Android operating system, actually uses both a flash file 
system and an FTL. YAFFS is used for the phone’s internal flash storage and the Microsoft FAT32 file 
system with an FTL to store data on the phone’s micro SD card. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Physics of Flash Memory 
Flash memory is a type of Electronically Erased Programmable Read Only 
Memory (EEPROM).  Flash can be in one of two states—erased and non-erased.  Flash is 
nonvolatile, in that it retains its content after the removal of power.  Flash memory cells 
are made up of floating gate transistors to store information, where the gate traps an 
electron.  The existence of a charge indicates a zero and no charge represents a one.  
Write operations can only program a one to a zero.  In order to clear a bit (change the 
value of a bit to one), an entire block of memory must be erased. 
A flash cell is made up of a floating gate, which is a transistor that is completely 
surrounded by insulating material and is governed by a control gate.  A process known as 
channel hot electron injection causes an electron to gain enough energy to pass through 
the isolating material.  The electrically isolating property allows the floating gate 
transistor to then trap the electron.  The electrical charge that is applied to the gate comes 
from the bit line at the drain side.  A positive charge, the absence of a trapped electron, is 
associated with the logical one while a negative charge, electrons trapped in the floating 
gate, is associated with the logical zero.  The only connection the floating gate has to the 
row, or word line, is through the control gate.  The trapped electrons give the floating 
gate a negative charge and work as a barrier between the floating gate and the control 
gate.  When the charge passing through the gate is measured and it is above a specified 
threshold, consistent with no electrons trapped within the floating gate, a one is indicated 
on read.  Conversely, when electrons are trapped, the charge passing through the gate 
should drop below the threshold and a zero is read.  The insulating material is what gives 
the flash its non-volatile property; the electron is trapped without the need of a constant 
refresh.  Programming NAND cells must be done at 512 byte page intervals, while NOR 
cells can be programmed on a word basis [3]. 
 Figure 1.   Flash Cell Erased State (From: [4]) 
Erasing a flash cell utilizes the Fowler–Nordheim tunneling process to remove the 
electrons from the floating gate.  A high voltage of opposite polarity is applied to the 
floating gate, forcing the trapped electrons through the insulating material to the surface.  
The negatively charging barrier is thus eliminated and the charge passing through the 
gate will rise above the threshold  [3]. 
 




Flash cells can be Single Level Cells (SLC) that hold one bit per cell or Multi 
Level Cells (MLC) that can store more than one bit per cell.  Storing more than one bit 
per cell is accomplished by storing multiple possible levels of electrical charge and using 
multiple threshold voltage levels.  Typically, MLC may represent four different states [5]. 
The tradeoff in more capacity of the MLC flash is increased read/write latency and a 
shorter lifetime [6].  The write latency is due to a more sophisticated programming 
technique to store the precise charge needed to achieve the threshold voltage distribution.  
Similarly, the read operation is longer because it takes longer to distinguish between the 
four possible charges stored in the cell.  The lifetime of MLC devices decreases due to 
the inability to distinguish between the four different states, compared to only two in SLC 
[7]. 
2. History and Trends of Flash 
The patent for NOR flash memory was filed by Fujio Masuoka in 1981.  Masuoka 
was working for Toshiba in Japan and was able to produce the first chip in 1984.  By 
1987, Masuoka developed the first NAND flash chip.  NOR flash was developed to store 
smaller amounts of data, have low access latencies and be able to execute in place, 
avoiding having to load software into RAM.  It was ideal for BIOS and firmware, 
information that rarely needs to be updated.  But NAND was developed with the idea to 
replace the hard disk drive market as long term storage.  The first NAND devices went on 
the market in 1990 [8]. 
With its small size, low power consumption, storage density, shock resistance and 
low cost, compared to other EPROM, NAND flash memory is the choice when solid state 
non-volatile memory is needed, especially in mobile devices.  As demand for personal 
devices such as digital cameras, cell phones, portable video game consoles and music 
players have grown, so has demand for flash memory.  The oldest applications date back 
to the mid 1990s and included SanDisk’s CompactFlash, Toshiba’s SmartMedia, Siemen 
AG/SanDisks’s MultiMediaCard and the physically larger Memory Stick introduced by 
Sony.  By 2000, Panasonic, SanDisk, Toshiba, Kodak developed Secure Digital cards and 
these devices have been the dominant removable format of flash memory in portable 
devices.  But SD cards have not penetrated the embedded system market because of their 
lack of compatibility with IDE/ATA; CompactFlash has had better market penetration.  
Various manufacturers have also produced USB flash drives since 2001. 
Memory chip capacity roughly follows Moore’s law because they share the same 
equipment and techniques used in production of integrated circuits.  Flash prices 
consistently dropped 30 – 40% from the late 1990s through 2003, but NAND flash has 
accelerated to a 50% decline driven by increased supplies.  Prices were approximately 
$10 per gigabyte in 2007 and have dropped to approximately $2 per gigabyte in 2009 [9]. 
 
Figure 3.   Price/GB Memory Trend (From: [9] with permission) 
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3. NOR Versus NAND Flash 
There are two types of cell arrays in flash memory, NAND and NOR.  They differ 
in how the memory arrays are connected and how memory is addressed to perform a read 
or write operation.  The cells in a NOR flash device are connected in parallel, allowing 
each cell to be read and programmed individually.  This connection resembles a NOR 
gate.  Read addressability is much like Random Access Memory:  NOR flash can be read 
byte by byte in constant time.  In NAND flash, the cells are connected in series, much 
like a NAND gate, which prevents an individual cell from being read or written to.  
Therefore, one complete interconnected series may be read or written.  NAND flash uses 
a shared bus for addresses and data transfers, while NOR uses a separate BUS for 
addressing, memory write and read operations [3]. 
The tradeoff from lack of cell level addressability in NAND flash is increased 
density.  NAND flash technology devices are more economical per bit and can store more 
information in a smaller area than NOR flash devices.  NOR flash was invented as an 
economical replacement for ROM, while the increased capacity of NAND was 
envisioned as competition for Hard Disk Drives as a secondary storage device.  One other 
advantage NAND has over NOR is a faster erase time.  This improvement is recognized 
through a smaller erase block.  The typical erase block size in NOR ranges from 64 to 
128 Kbytes, while the typical NAND erase block size ranges from 8 to 32 Kbytes.  The 
smaller NAND block size will speed an erase operation from 5 seconds in a NOR device 
to 4 milliseconds in a NAND device [10]. 
Because of its serial nature, NAND flash has a multiplexed input/output bus that 
carries both address information and data.  The bus is typically 8 or 16 bits wide and is 
too small to carry an address in one cycle.  Data is accessed by the address of the data 
first applied in three to five cycles.  Once the address is loaded, the same input/output line 
is used to transfer the data residing at that address [11]. 
4. Flash Endurance and Limitations 
Flash has a limit to the number of erase-write cycles.  The upper limit varies 
greatly from sources, but the range is typically 10^4 to 10^6 writes and the limitation is 
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improving with time.  This limit is also referred to as write endurance.  SLC flash 
typically has a higher write endurance than MLC and NOR generally has a better write 
endurance than NAND flash [2]. 
Manufacturers may implement a wear leveling scheme in order to even out the 
wear across all flash cells and increase the effective lifetime of the capacity of the device.  
Wear leveling will not improve the lifetime of any individual cell; rather, it spreads write 
operations across all cells, so no one particular cell wears out before others, thus reducing 
the capacity of the device.   
Once bits in a block can no longer be erased and permanently hold a value of 
zero, the block is marked as bad.  NAND flash devices are shipped with bad blocks 
already existing on the device.  Typically, 2% of a NAND flash device will contain bad 
blocks when shipped [11]. 
In addition to write endurance, there is an upper limit to how long flash memory 
can hold data.  The quality of the voltage level will deteriorate over time.  Most data 
sheets for commercially available flash indicate an upper limit range of 10 to 100 years 
before data is lost [12]. 
5. Flash Memory Logical Structure 
The logical structure of flash memory from least to greatest granularity is erase 
zones, blocks and pages.  Erase zones usually consist of 256 to 1024 blocks.  Not every 
device uses the concept of erase zones.  One or more erase blocks may be organized into 
an erase zone.  A logical concept, zones can be used to manage bad blocks.  As blocks go 
bad, data may be swapped into good blocks from the bad blocks within the same zone.   
The flash block is the lowest unit that may be erased.  A block may consist of 32, 
64 or 128 flash pages.  The total number of blocks per flash device varies upon the total 
storage capacity. Flash pages are usually a multiple of 512 bytes of usable storage area 
(excluding spare area) and typical sizes include 512 bytes, 2K bytes or 4K bytes.  The 
flash page is the lowest addressable unit in NAND [11]. 
Flash pages are further comprised of usable area and spare area.  The usable area 
is where user data is stored and the spare area is used for flash metadata.  The spare area 
size can range from 8 to 64 bytes, depending on the size of the page.  The metadata will 
contain information regarding the page number, which erase block the page belongs, and 
will be used to map the physical location of the data back to the logical structures of the 
flash transition layer.  Other information held within the spare area could include a dirty 
bit, which will mark a particular page as outdated, indicating that the information has 
changed and that the page no longer contains the most current data and ECC data.  It may 
also contain a bit that marks the block as ready to be erased and if the block has gone bad 
(no longer usable because, for example, it has reached its end of lifetime due to the 
number of erase operations performed).  The particular structure and information 
contained within the spare area is not standardized and is manufacturer specific.  This 
information will be used by the wear leveling algorithms and as such will be proprietary.  
The spare area may be used to describe an individual page or they may be aggregated to 
describe an entire erase block [11]. 
 
Figure 4.   Example of Spare Area Detail (From: [14]) 
6. Flash Specific Operations 
A flash page may be individually read and programmed (bits changed from one to 
zero), but an individual page cannot be erased (set to one).  For example, a byte may be 
programmed from 1111111 to 11111100.  Further possible changes may be 11111000 or 
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11011000, but 11111101 is not possible, as it changes the rightmost bit from a zero to a 
one.  Flash allows random access reads and programs, but not rewrites and erasure 
operations [2]. 
There are three possible operations that may be performed on a flash memory 
device.  They are read a page, program a page, and erase a block.  The read operation is 
the fastest of the three and typically takes 25 microseconds for NAND flash and 20 
nanoseconds for NOR.  A program operation will typically take 250 microseconds for 
NAND and 10 microseconds for NOR.  The erase block operation is the longest and may 
take as long as 3 milliseconds for NAND and up to 5 seconds in NOR [5] [12]. 
To maximize the lifespan of the memory cells, the manufacturers of the flash 
implement a wear leveling algorithm.  In contrast, a magnetic disk in an overwrite 
operation will reuse the same sector that the data was originally stored upon.  So as data 
is written, deleted and rewritten, the early sectors on the disk will be used much more 
than the later.  Wear leveling is not as large a concern to the manufacturers of magnetic 
storage disks, because the ceiling of the lifetime of the hard drive is not dictated by the 
lifetime of the sector, but rather by the mechanical device needed to write and read data 
off the disk.  But if the operations used for a magnetic hard disk drive were used on flash, 
blocks used to hold file system metadata (which change often) would wear out and go 
bad.  This would decrease the overall effective lifetime of the device [14]. 
The algorithms used for wear leveling spread the write and erase operations over 
the entire flash device, so that wear occurs evenly.  Further, when data is changed, the 
same page is not reused, but the updated data is written to a new physical page, that is set 
to all ones and the old page will be marked for erase.  This is referred to as an out-of-
place write.  In order to maximize power and wear leveling efficiency, a block is not 
erased immediately but rather a group of blocks will be erased when space is needed [14]. 
7. Access via the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) Interface 
Obtaining a logical acquisition will not create a complete picture of all the data 
stored on a flash device.  A complete image of the physical layer will produce all stored 
data.  One non-invasive method of obtaining physical access to flash memory chips is 
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through the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) connection pads [13], also known as the 
“Standard Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture.”  A JTAG access port is 
normally used to test selected printed circuit boards during the manufacture process and 
to debug embedded software, but can also be used to obtain a physical layer image of 
flash memory chips, indirectly through the circuit board. JTAG access ports do not 
physically exist on flash memory chips, but are built into the circuit boards that are 
connected to flash memory chips.   
The JTAG approach is not without its problems. The location of JTAG ports are 
not always published by the manufacturer of embedded devices and the ports do not exist 
on all devices [13]. Some devices that have JTAG ports do not give the interface 
unrestricted access to the flash memory map. Finally, the JTAG ports may be disabled 
after production prior to distribution to the end user. 
 Figure 5.   JTAG Ports on a Flash Embedded Device (From: [13] with permission) 
8. Wear Level Approach with the Flash Translation Layer 
The purpose of the FTL is to present flash memory to a file system as if it were a 
rewriteable block device, such as a magnetic disk, while the device driver, or controller 
hardware, addresses the peculiarities of flash memory that the higher level software is not 
concerned with, such as wear leveling, block reclamation and crash recovery.  The basic 
idea behind the wear leveling technique is to map the virtual block number presented by 
the host operating system to a physical flash page on the memory chip.  There are no 
known open source FTL implementations. 
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FTLs are complex because the map is stored on the flash device itself, with only a 
small portion of the map in memory. FTLs must track which logical blocks are updated 
most frequently in order to minimize the cost of updating the map when the physical 
location of the data has changed.  Different FTLs have been implemented by different 
manufacturers. There is no need for compatibility between FTLs, because most exist in 
standalone storage devices such as USB thumb drives, SD cards and solid state storage 
devices [2]: compatibility is provided at the logical layer. This lack of compatibility 
would surely complicate any forensic analysis that took place beneath the FTL at the 
physical level. 
Intel’s FTL implementation consists of two mappings: a virtual block number to a 
logical block and page number map and then a logical block to a physical erase block 
map.  Most of the virtual block to logical block map is stored on the flash itself, except 
for the first few virtual block entries, which change often in a FAT file system. The 
logical block numbering scheme minimizes map changes, for when valid pages are 
rewritten to a new physical block, the page offset into the new physical block remains the 
same and the logical block number need not change.  On the flash, there is also a 
secondary virtual to logical map.  This secondary map is used for efficiency, for changes 
to the map can be written to the same physical block, delaying a block reclamation 
operation, while the primary map entry is marked as obsolete [15]. 
The second map is a much smaller logical block to physical block mapping that is 
loaded into RAM when the flash memory is mounted.  This mapping changes often, but 
the cost is much less as it resides in RAM [15]. 
 
 Figure 6.   FTL Mapping Structures (From: [2]) 
Other FTLs include the NAND FTL, which uses one of two different mapping 
schemes, depending on whether the flash has spare area.  The mapping scheme associates 
a chain of physical blocks with a virtual block.  If the flash does not have a spare area, the 
NFTL searches the chain sequentially until it finds the relevant valid page associated with 
the virtual block.  When data is changed, the page is written to the next physical block 
and the old block becomes obsolete.  Once all blocks in the chain are used, all valid pages 
are written to a new block and it becomes the head of a new chain.  If the device uses 
spare area, the chain is no longer than two.  Changes to pages are written to the second 
physical block in the chain, the backup block.  There may be multiple versions of virtual 
blocks in the backup physical block, but when it is full or space needs to be reclaimed, all 
valid data is written to a new physical block, which becomes the head of a new chain of 
length two and the old chain of physical blocks are erased [2]. 
Devices utilizing Windows CE 2.1 and later, along with in-line flash memory, or 
flash memory without a controller on board, implement M-Systems’ TrueFFS as a flash 
translation layer [16].  For the release of Windows CE .NET 4.2, Microsoft claimed that 
it would no longer support TrueFFS [17].  TrueFFS is disclosed in U.S. patent number 
5,404,485, but the details of the format used to store relevant data in the spare area, such 
as markers for invalid pages are not included.  According to the patent, each erase block 
contains a header and a map for each page within the block.  But the patent does not 
specify where, in the block, the map is stored; whether it is distributed amongst the spare 
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areas for each page or contiguous at the start of the block.  Each map entry for a 
particular page will have a status field for its corresponding page; indicating whether the 
page is free and writeable, deleted and not writeable, or allocated and holds user data 
along with its logical address [18]. 
9. Wear Level Approach with Flash File Systems 
While the Flash Translation Layer hides the management of flash memory to the 
file system by disguising it as a block device, a file system that is designed specifically 
for flash exposes all the details and lets the file system manage wear leveling and block 
reclamation.  The advantage of the flash file system solution is that it can be more 
efficient as the file system is not buried beneath layers of mapping used for block device 
emulation.  This makes it ideal for resource-constrained devices such as cell phones.  But 
the FTL is a better solution for removable media, as the FAT format is a rewriteable file 
system understood by all Windows, Mac and Unix/Linux platforms [2]. 
Examples of flash file systems include JFFS/JFFS2 [19] and YAFFS [20].  JFFS 
was created for a specific application and is not widely used.  JFFS2 was used on the One 
Laptop Per Child program [21] and YAFFS is currently being used as the file system for 
embedded flash in Android [1]. Unlike the FTL, JFFS/JFFS2 and YAFFS are open 
source. 
Yet Another Flash File System was developed by Aleph One as a file system 
designed specifically for NAND flash.  YAFFS stores its file data in chunks.  Each 
YAFFS chunk is the same size as a NAND flash page, 512 bytes.  YAFFS stores 
metadata, or tags, in the spare area.  This information contains a file id number, a chunk 
number, a write serial number, a tag error correcting code, a page status field, a block 
status field and the bytes-in-page used.  It is the same format used by SmartMedia on 




Byte SmartMedia Usage YAFFS Usage 
0…511 Data Data. Either file data or file header depending on tags. 
512…515 Reserved Tags 
516 Data Status Byte. Not used. Data Status Byte.  If more than 4 bits are zero, then this 
page is discarded. 
517 Block Status Byte Block Status Byte 
518…519 Block Address Tags 
520…522 ECC on second 256 bytes of data ECC on second 256 bytes of data 
523…524 Block Address Tags 
525…527 ECC on first 256 bytes of data ECC on first 256 bytes of data 
Table 1.   YAFFS Spare Area Detail (From: [20]) 
Field Comment Size for 1KB Chunk Size for 2KB Chunk 
blockState Block state. non-0xFF for bad block 1 byte 1 byte 
chunkId 32-bit chunk Id 4 bytes 4 bytes 
objectId 32-bit object Id 4 bytes 4 bytes 
nBytes Number of data bytes in this chunk 2 bytes 2 bytes 
blockSequence sequence number for this block 4 bytes 4 bytes 
tagsEcc ECC on tags area 3 bytes 3 bytes 
ecc ECC, 3 bytes/256 bytes of data 12 bytes 24 bytes 
Table 2.   YAFFS Tags Usage (From: [20]) 
The file id is used to associate the chunk with a file.  The chunk number is a count 
that starts at zero, which represents the file header, and increases by one for each chunk 
needed to store the entire file.  A file id of zero indicates that the chunk is deleted, but not 
yet erased by the flash garbage collector.  The block status field indicates whether a block 
has gone bad and the page status field indicates if the page is valid or discarded.  If four 
bits or more are zero, the page is discarded [20]. 
When a chunk is “overwritten,” meaning that the data has been updated, the new 
data is written to a new flash page, but with the same tag data.  The exception is that each 
tag receives a 2-bit write serial number that is increased with every write.  This serial 
number contributes to recovery after a system crash during a write operation.  If power is 
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lost after the new chunk is written, but before the old chunk is marked as dirty, the higher 
serial number will indicate the latest version.  The old chunk is then marked as a dirty 
page within the spare area and is ready for garbage collection.   
A block can be erased on two different occasions.  The first is if all pages within a 
block are dirty, and the second is if there is one page that is still valid.  In the second 
case, the valid page will be rewritten to a new block and the current block will now be 
released for collection [20]. 
The Journaling Flash File System was designed by Axis Communications and 
was released for the 2.0 Linux kernel.  The motivation behind developing JFFS was to 
address the lack of wear leveling and unsafe rewrite operations when standard file 
systems were used, while flash memory was treated as a standard block device with 512 
byte sectors.  When a standard file system requests blocks from the free list, it tends to 
favor blocks that hold data which changes often, while ignoring static ones.  This will 
lead to uneven wear with some blocks never changing and others with a high turnover 
rate [19]. 
The design of JFFS is a log based file system, in which a circular data structure is 
used to write all data sequentially in the form of nodes.  JFFS writes data linearly through 
the flash device, where the oldest node is the head and the newest is the tail.  The header 
information for each node contains the name of the file to which it belongs by storing the 
32-bit inode number, the name of the file and a 32-bit version number which is totally 
ordered for each inode.  If a node contains data, the header information will also contain 
the offset in the file where the data belongs.  A node with a similar offset, but found 
earlier in the log is superseded by the later node, distinguished by the version number 
[19]. 
Garbage collection works by observing the node at the head of the log.  If the 
node is already obsolete, it is skipped and the garbage collection process moves the head 
to the next node.  If the node is valid, it is rendered obsolete by rewriting the data and 
header information to the tail and the head is moved to the next node.  This process is 
continued until JFFS has rendered a complete flash erase block obsolete.  Because the 
 22
garbage collection process rewrites nodes to the tail in order to free a complete flash 
block, JFFS cannot wait until the entire flash memory has been used—when the tail 
meets the head.  Therefore, a slack space is needed at all times between the tail and the 
head of the log [19]. 
In order to provide a data compression capability to meet a customer requirement, 
the developers at Red Hat reworked JFFS and developed JFFS2.  JFFS2 also supports 
hard links and improves the efficiency of the garbage collection process. The problems 
addressed in garbage collection also changed the layout of the file directory.  JFFS2 no 
longer uses a circular log data structure.  Instead, when the flash device is mounted a map 
of only essential information is loaded into memory.  This map is a hash table which 
contains an entry for each inode.  For each entry in the map there exists a struct, named 
jffs2_inode_cache, containing the inode number, the pointer to the head of a linked list 
that contains all the physical nodes containing the file data and the number of links to the 
inode—to support hard links [19]. 
Essentially, JFFS2 is a series of linked lists.  When a file needs to be accessed, 
JFFS2 will use the appropriate inode number to look up the jffs2_inode_cache entry in 
the hash map.  It can then reconstruct the physical layout of the file by walking the linked 
list and deriving the physical location of each node from the entries and where it can 
remain in memory [19]. 
All flash erase blocks are assigned to one of three lists: the clean list, which 
contains blocks that store valid data; the dirty list, which contains blocks that have at least 
one obsolete node and the free list, which contains blocks that have been successfully 
deleted.  Wear leveling is achieved by statistically choosing the clean list or dirty list to 
erase a block when room is needed [19]. 
B. PRIOR WORK 
1. Introduction 
Prior art in flash forensics can be classified as work that attempts to identify 
methods to recover remnant data from flash memory, attempts to acquire logical and 
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physical images, or other, where the authors recognize the peculiarities of flash memory, 
such as wear leveling and how it impacts data retention.  The following is the result of a 
thorough search of relevant published articles in the field. 
Title Authors Date 
Physical Acquisition 
Forensic imaging of embedded systems using JTAG [13] Breeuwsma, M 2003 
Forensic Data Recovery from Flash Memory [11] Breeuwsma, M., et al 2006 
Logical Acquisition 
Analysis of USB Flash Drives in a Virtual Environment [22] Bem, D., and Huebner E. 2007 
An overall Assessment of Mobile Internal Acquisition Tool [23] Distefano, A. and Me G. 2008 
Remnant Data 
Data Remnants in Flash Memory Devices [12] Skorobogatov, S. 2005 
A Study of Information Privacy and Data Sanitization Problems 
[24] 
Roubos, D., et al 2007 
Ten Good Reasons Why You should Shift Focus to Small Scale 
Digital Device Forensics [25] 
Knijff, R 2007 
An Integrated Approach to Recovering Deleted Files from NAND 
Flash Data [26] 
Luck, J. and Stokes M. 2008 
Recovering data from USB Flash memory sticks that have been 
damaged or electronically erased [27] 




Algorithms and Data Structures for Flash Memories [2] Gal, E. and Toledo S. 2005 
An Investigation into the Development of an Anti-Forensic Tool to 
Obscure USB Flash Drive Device Information on a Windows XP 
Platform [28] 
Thomas, P. and Morris A. 2008 
Table 3.   Prior Work Articles 
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2. Physical Acquisition 
In the paper “Forensic imaging of embedded systems using JTAG (boundary-
scan),” Marcel Brueeuwsma proposes using the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) as a 
physical means to produce an image of stored data in flash memory on an embedded 
device.  The author’s goal is to produce an image of an embedded system with minimal 
changes to the embedded memory; maintaining forensic integrity.  In particular, the 
author states that for many applications, software needs to be loaded onto the device in 
order to begin retrieving data.  This process results in a loss of integrity.  Small-scale 
embedded devices are a suitable target for this technique because they use memory chips 
and not disk drives to store data [13]. 
The JTAG method will make a full forensic copy of the flash memory, but the 
difficult task is finding the JTAG test pads.  The pads are not necessarily labeled on the 
circuit board and the manufacturer might not publish the locations in other literature.  The 
JTAG pads do not exist on a flash memory chip, but on another component within an 
embedded device, such as the processor.  The authors offer two JTAG modes that will 
result in a complete image with NOR flash: extest and debug, while only extest will work 
with NAND.  The authors provide a detailed algorithm for identifying JTAG access 
ports, through a brute force measure of every pad on the chip board (some pads on the 
board are not JTAG) and two alternative, less reliable and more destructive methods that 
involve multi-meter testing and x-ray imaging of traces on the circuited board.  The 
process of measuring each pad involves providing an input to the pad and reading the 
output, matching it with an expectation.  Other advantages of a JTAG retrieval include 
the minimal chance of altering data, while disadvantages include the long process, hard to 
find ports and the process may require disassembly of the device as not all devices are 
JTAG enabled [13]. 
In “Forensic Data Recovery from Flash Memory,” Marcel Breeuwsma, et al 
present a low level, physical layer method to recover data from a flash memory system 
and then analyze the results in order to rebuild the file system.  The authors collected 45 
different make and model flash memory sticks in which to acquire data.  The authors 
describe three possible methods to extract the contents from a flash memory chip [11]. 
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The first method is to use a “flasher tool.”  A flasher is a device used by 
manufacturers for debugging and performing software updates in the field.   Flashers are 
used by hackers for altering device functionality.  Flashers are not generic and no one 
tool can be used on all devices because of non-standard interfaces.  But one tool may 
provide compatibility across a range of devices.  A user should be trained on the tool 
prior to use, as a flasher may have functions that are potentially harmful to forensic 
investigations.  Some flashers may not make a full forensic copy of the flash memory.  
The authors provide several resources where these tools can be found and display the 
functionality of one particular flasher tool [11]. 
The second method is to use the JTAG access ports.  It is the same method as 
described in [13]. 
The third method is to physically remove the flash memory chip from the printed 
circuit board and read the memory with a chip programmer.  This method involves de-
soldering the chip from the circuit board, cleaning and preparing the chip for further 
processing and then reading the chip with a programmer.  Each step involves different 
alternatives based upon the chip implementation.  For example, de-soldering may be 
accomplished with a soldering iron or a heat gun; chip preparation and cleaning may 
differ based upon whether the chip was removed from a Thin Small-Outline Package or 
from a Ball Grid Array.  Advantages of physical extraction include a guarantee of data 
integrity and a complete forensic image can be obtained, while disadvantages include the 
risk of damage [11]. 
After physical layer data extraction, the authors propose methods to analyze the 
data in order to reconstruct the logical layer.  This involves a reconstruction of the flash 
file system.  The authors liberally use the term flash file system to also include the FTL.  
The key steps in the process are to understand how the file systems translate the logical 
layer to the physical layer and how to distinguish valid from invalid data.  With regards 
to interpreting FTL data, the authors described the difficulty of retrieving proprietary data 
during their attempts in identifying the controller and memory chip manufacturers.  
Controllers were especially difficult to identify.  While most memory chips clearly were 
identified with the manufacturer’s logo, the controllers were not.  The authors used the 
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Internet to research the controllers, but were still unable to identify all.  For those chips 
identified, FTL documentation was rarely found [11]. 
Next, the authors narrow their focus to specific implementations of flash memory 
on cell phones.  They show successful results for reconstructing file systems on Samsung, 
Nokia and Symbian phones.  Physical layer data was extracted using both flasher tools 
and by physically removing the memory chips from the phones.  The file systems were 
recreated through the use of manufacturer provided documentation, in the case of the 
Samsung phone, and through heuristic methods with the Nokia and Symbian phones.  In 
addition to a reconstruction of the current file systems, the authors were able to partially 
recover older file system versions through header information and the understanding of 
physical address schemes used in versioning data.  The paper concludes with a real-world 
evidence collection experience [11]. 
In the real-world experience, the authors were able to reconstruct the Smart Media 
format based upon available literature.  They then gave an example of how to reconstruct 
an unknown flash file system through identifying the metadata, identifying the 
granularity of the file system, analyzing the spare area metadata in order to reconstruct 
the logical block numbers and reconstructing the logical to physical map.  The authors 
were able to confirm their results by comparing hash totals of the blocks of a logical and 
physical image [11]. 
3. Logical Acquisition 
In “Analysis of USB Flash Drives in a Virtual Environment,” the authors Derek 
Bem and Ewa Huebner discuss the advantages and repercussions of using a virtual 
machine to analyze the contents of a USB flash drive obtained in a forensic investigation.  
The analysis does not consider the peculiarities inherit in flash devices, such as the FTL, 
flash file system, erase functionality or wear leveling.  The authors acquire a logical level 
image of the data on the flash drive through the dd function via the FTK Imager.  The 
authors then propose a situation where a forensic investigator would be able to mount a 
copy of the original imaged file, search for and record evidence without consideration to 
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the forensic integrity of the dd file.  As far as the methodology used to acquire and 
analyze the data, there was no distinction made between a flash drive and a magnetic 
device [22]. 
In "An overall Assessment of Mobile Internal Acquisition Tool," Gianluigi Me 
present the Mobile Internal Acquisition Tool (MIAT) as a tool to acquire memory from 
Symbian and Windows-based smart phones via the internal memory slot, as opposed to 
using data cables or JTAG access pads.  The system only acquires logical layer data, not 
physical, by use of operating system APIs.  The author’s motivation is to establish a 
method of low-level data acquisition, with minimal changes to data, which is not 
dependent on the large amount of non-standard cable interfaces used by competing smart 
phone manufacturers.  The tool also offers parallel acquisition and is based upon open 
source tools.  The use of memory cards to acquire data, with the operating system as an 
intermediary, reduces the hardware footprint at the crime scene and makes the MIAT 
very portable.  The methodology is to start at the file system root and copy a file directory 
at a time, creating an md5 hash of each chunk copied.  MIAT will recover all logical file 
system data structures and deleted database entries, such as contacts, through APIs, but 
cannot recover deleted files.  MIAT does not guarantee complete data integrity, as some 
files may be modified through the use of some APIs.  The presentation compares MIAT 
to the Paraben Device Seizure, a proprietary tool that also utilizes logical acquisition 
methods.  The data recovery coverage is better than the Paraben system; is equal in 
integrity, but is slower in acquisition time [23]. 
4. Remnant Data 
In “Data Remanence in Flash Memory Devices,” Sergei Skorobogatov proposes a 
method to extract remnant data from flash cells that have been erased.  Remnant data is 
information that can be recovered from a storage media after new information has been 
written over old, in attempts to delete or overwrite the old information.  Remnant data is 
most often associated with magnetic media.  This is different than residual data, which is 
information that has been unintentionally left behind at any level of a computer system.  
The author provides example targets such as smartcards and microcontrollers, which 
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utilize a password protected boot-loader that restricts firmware updates and data access.  
In particular, the author is targeting NOR flash.  Typically, the on-chip operating system 
will completely erase code and memory before uploading new code, so that a new 
program cannot access old keys and previously encrypted data.  The process of writing to 
a cell, capturing electrons, will cause a gradual accumulation of electrons in the cell 
which the erasing cannot release.  This is one cause for the limited lifetime of flash 
memory, as it is no longer possible to erase a cell back to the one state after a write 
because of the accumulation of electrons [12]. 
The author found that there is a difference in the threshold voltage of a cell that 
was programmed to zero and then erased, and a cell that had not been erased.  He also 
found that cells that were subjected to an erase operation, that were already erased 
(holding a value of one), would hold a positive charge.  The author’s best results were 
taken on cells that had not been programmed and with those that had been programmed 
and subject to just one erase operation.  The author implemented two different methods in 
order to measure a cell’s threshold voltage.  The non-invasive method involved 
connecting the memory chips to a test board controlled by a PC that could directly 
control the voltages.  The semi-invasive method involved the use of a laser diode pointer 
to read threshold voltages.  His methods will only work on a small number of chips, 
which are older designs.  The author provides countermeasures including cycling 10–100 
program/erase operations with random data before programming sensitive data; program 
all cells directly prior to performing an erase operation; use chips based upon newer 
technology, because newer hardware with higher densities will make retrieval more 
difficult.  The author does not explain why he chose 10 to 100 operations; the number 
appears to be arbitrary, but he does reference methods proposed in Peter Gutmann’s 
controversial article regarding remnant data on magnetic disk drives [29] [30] [31].  The 
author also acknowledges the possibility that residual data may exist at the physical layer 
after blocks have been mapped out, but before the blocks have been erased [12]. 
In "Ten Good Reasons Why You should Shift Focus to Small Scale Digital 
Device Forensics," Ronald van der Knijff presents the reasons why more consideration is 
needed in the field of Small Scale Digital Device Forensics.  The presentation is 
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European focused, in particular from the perspective of a member of the Netherlands 
Forensic Institute.  His arguments include:  a 100% mobile phone penetration rate in the 
Netherlands in 2007; personal devices are only getting smaller with flash EEPROM the 
most popular means to store data; flash has more potential forensic opportunity than disk 
drives; anti-forensic methods are more difficult on small-scale digital devices than on 
personal computers; the tools and procedures used for small scale devices are not as 
developed as other forensic tools.  After presenting his argument, the author presents and 
evaluates various current data extraction tools and methods.  At the physical level, he 
presents the JTAG method and the physical extraction of memory chips.  At the logical 
level, he reviews flasher tools.  In general, advantages of physical extraction include data 
integrity and the possibility of producing a complete forensic image.  Flasher tools are 
easier to use, but may not guarantee a complete forensic image of the flash memory.  The 
author presents experiences in data recovery methodology, including recreating the file 
system from physical layer acquisition to recreating deleted or incomplete video files.  He 
concludes with future research opportunities [25]. 
In “A Study of Information Privacy and Data Sanitization Problems,” Demetrios 
Roubos, et al. describe the privacy issues caused by not sanitizing digital storage medium 
properly upon disposal.  The paper provides anecdotal evidence of privacy data recovered 
from hard disk drives after purchase on the secondary market without the use of proper 
sanitization techniques.  After offering a history of hard disk drives, the authors provide 
an overview of sanitization tools and standards.  While the majority of the paper is 
concerned with hard disk drives, the authors provide a section on flash memory devices.  
A readily available tool for sanitization, such as provided for hard disk drives, is not 
presented; the authors provide a standard to guide the reader based upon the Department 
of Defense standard for sanitizing Flash EPROM.  The authors guide the reader to erase 
the entire chip and then overwrite all locations that contained data with a character, then 
its compliment, and then with a random character, which is the DoD standard, 5220.22–
M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual" [32], and may have been 
supplemented by NIST SP800–88.  This only addresses the logical layer, as controller 
proprietary commands are needed to access the physical layer data.  The three pass 
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method may not effectively erase a flash device as spare area metadata may not be 
reached and artifacts created by wear leveling, out of place writes and block recovery 
operations may not be addressed by erasing and overwriting data at the logical layer [24]. 
In “An Integrated Approach to Recovering Deleted Files from NAND Flash 
Data,” the authors, James Luck and Mark Stokes, propose a methodology to recover 
deleted or corrupted MPEG-4 video through the use of recovered file metadata.  The 
authors do not propose how the physical image was obtained, but do step through the 
process of rebuilding the FAT volume by building a version table containing all available 
versions of logical sectors.  Different versions of video files can then be constructed 
using different versions of the same logical sectors and any missing sectors are filled with 
null place holders so video files may still load.  The authors also used the Volume Boot 
Record to aid in rebuilding the FAT.  For example, the VBR was able to tell the authors 
the sector size, the number of sectors, and the root directory.  The authors make particular 
note about the fact that files on flash will become especially fragmented.  It is not clear if 
they are referring to physical layer fragmentation or logical layer fragmentation, but 
because the authors assume that the File Allocation Table is unfragmented, they appear to 
be performing a logical layer recovery.  The process from here entails rebuilding deleted 
files at the logical level and is not flash specific.  The process involves recovering files 
through analysis of the File Allocation Table, identifying MPEG-4 data through header 
analysis and filling gaps within the deleted file, which reestablishes the ability to play the 
files on readily available video playback software [26]. 
In “Recovering data from USB Flash memory sticks that have been damaged or 
electronically erased,” Braden Phillips, Duwayne Schmidt and Dan Kelly describe a 
series of experiments that attempt to physically damage flash memory devices and then 
recover the data previously stored upon the devices.  The authors used two different 
methods to recover the data: through connecting the flash memory device to a computer, 
and by directly connecting a microcontroller to the flash memory chips [27]. 
The authors’ experiments consisted of saving a text file and compressed audio 
files to a number of flash devices, and then applying over-voltage from a car battery to 
the signal lines, power and ground pins and to the data lines of a flash device; soaking a 
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flash device in water to induce corrosion and cause a short circuit; incinerating a device 
with petrol; stomping on a device with a rubber heel boot; striking a device with a 
hammer; shooting a device with a 9 mm pistol and cooking a device in a microwave.  The 
authors were able to recover data from the devices that were damaged by over-voltage, 
stomped upon, soaked in water and incinerated.  They were not able to read data back 
from the devices that were cooked in the microwave oven, smashed with a hammer and 
shot with the pistol.  While the experiments were amusing, they lacked controls and had 
no way of evaluating the amount of damage that was necessary to render the device 
unusable [27]. 
5. Other 
In "Algorithms and Data Structures for Flash Memories," Eran Gal and Sivan 
Toledo surveyed the U.S. Patent applications for technologies that address flash specific 
storage techniques in order to explain flash file systems.   The authors state the 
inadequacy of magnetic disk file systems for use with flash memory, such as wear 
leveling.  They present summarized versions of the algorithms and data structures from 
patent applications that address the peculiarities of flash memory and data structures used 
for application specific memory storage [2]. 
In “An Investigation into the Development of an Anti-Forensic Tool to Obscure 
USB Flash Drive Device Information on a Windows XP Platform,” Paula Thomas and 
Alun Morris analyze the registry key entries on a Windows XP system to find the 
changes made by USB storage devices and develop an Anti-Forensics tool that will delete 
or obscure these entries.  After an introduction to the prevalent use of USB storage 
devices for legal purposes and in criminal activities, the authors describe the detail entries 
of registry keys in a Microsoft XP environment and the data stored that uniquely 
identifies a USB storage device, along with its vendor/manufacturer, product 
identification and how to find the drive letter assigned when it was last connected to the 
system.  In addition to registry entries, the authors provide an analysis of log files that 
will contain the last time a particular device was connected to the system, and which 
drivers were required to be installed so the device could be used [28]. 
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The ultimate goal of the analysis provided was to develop a tool that could 
obscure the changes made to a Windows XP system to cause delays in investigating the 
forensic trail.  The authors developed a tool that can be stored upon a USB storage device 
and run automatically upon connection.  The tool provides the following functions:  the 
ability to add a fake device to the registry; the ability to delete the keys associated with a 
device that was registered on the system; amend the log file with a false entry and display 
the Modify, Access and Change times associated with USB device activity, with the 
option to email the results to a given email address.  Future work included modifying 
registry keys that the authors overlooked and had not found after their prototype was 
developed, and developing better Anti-Forensic information that looked less suspicious to 
a potential forensic investigator [28]. 
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III. OPPORTUNITES FOR RECOVERY 
A. RESIDUAL DATA AS A RESULT OF OUT OF PLACE WRITES 
1. Background 
The physical characteristics of flash memory provide the opportunity to recover 
residual data.  Residual data is information unintentionally left behind on computer media 
and can exist at any level of a computer system.  Remnant data is information that can be 
recovered from a storage media after new information has been written to the media.  An 
out of place write caused by an overwrite operation provides the best opportunity for the 
recovery of residual data in flash memory.  An overwrite can be triggered by a user 
changing data within a file, altering the metadata associated with a file or deleting the 
file.  These operations will all cause changes to be made to data at the logical level, but 
because of the physical limitations of flash memory, the changed data cannot be rewritten 
to the same flash page on the flash memory device.  The Flash Transition Layer (FTL) or 
the flash file system will rewrite the changed data onto a different, clean flash page, mark 
the old page as dirty and queue the dirty page for garbage collection.  How long the old 
page remains on the flash device without further alteration will be dependent upon the 
implementation of the flash file system, or FTL, and when the system decides it needs to 
reclaim blocks.   
In addition to recovering deleted data, observation of the metadata tags and 
mapping structures associated with the residual data can be used to recreate older 
versions of files that still exist on the flash media, or at least show that the current version 
on the flash device is not the original version [11]. 
2. FTL 
M-System’s TrueFFS and Intel’s FTL present the flash device to a host system as 
a block device utilizing a FAT file system.  So, the host system will attempt to rewrite 
changes to a file back to the same sector.  Because the host system is only working at the 
logical level, these changes also include the attempt by the host to delete a file, as this is 
just a rewrite, altering data in the FAT.  The FTL will write the changed data to the first 
clean flash page it finds.  The FTL will write out the new data to the physical location 
and mark the old flash page as obsolete by altering the entry in the block allocation map.  
The new page may be within the same block if there is room.  If not, the page will be 
written to a new block.  The page will not be erased until the flash device is full and a 
flash block with dirty pages needs to be erased in order to free up space.  Our literature 
review found no information on how the FTL chooses which block to erase when space is 
needed.  Garbage collection priority is not specified within the patent, but might be based 
upon the number of invalid pages within the block and the block’s erase count.  Either 
way, the length of time residual data exists on the flash is not solely dependent upon the 
extent of utilization [33]. 
 
Figure 7.   Target for Recovery in the FTL 
TrueFFS has an additional feature called the FAT filter.  TrueFFS monitors the 
FAT for changes that indicate clusters that have been freed.  TrueFFS will in turn mark 
the associated pages as obsolete.  The blocks containing these pages may now become 
available for garbage collection earlier than if the FAT filter were not implemented.  This 
may decrease the time residual data exists on a flash memory device utilizing TrueFFS 
[34]. 
Locating obsolete pages with the same logical sequence number as valid pages 
may be used for file versioning.  But one would have to use file carving techniques to 
determine if a recreated file, using an obsolete page with the same logical sequence 
number, makes sense, because unlike flash file systems, the FTL does not store useful 
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metadata such as inodes and file names in the spare area; carving would be done on 512 
byte page boundaries.  The only helpful information used for file carving is the file 
metadata stored within the data area used by the FAT file system [11]. 
3. YAFFS 
In YAFFS, when data is overwritten in flash, the new data is written to a new 
flash page with the same metadata tags and the old page is simply marked as discarded.  
This is done by programming a data status field within the YAFFS metadata that are 
stored in the spare area for the flash page.  But the original data within the page remains 
unaltered.  Pages are not assigned to a dirty list and queued for garbage collection.  Only 
blocks are assigned and only those blocks that contain one or less valid pages.  If the 
embedded flash device has been filled and there is a need for a clean block to write 
additional data, YAFFS will first check the dirty list, choose a block, erase it and then 
write the new data.  If there are no entirely dirty blocks to choose, YAFFS will choose 
the block with the most dirty pages, rewrite the valid pages onto a clean block, erase the 
block that now contains only dirty pages and write the new data.  In either case, the old 
residual data will now be lost.  The time before a page is erased will depend upon how 
much the flash device is utilized.  The best opportunity for data recovery exists when a 
flash device has been written to infrequently [20]. 
YAFFS uses a file id stored in the spare area, which is similar to an inode 
number.  A page that has been marked as invalid, but contains the same file id as a 
currently valid page will hold previous version data, while the page id will tell where the 
information belongs within the file [20]. 
 Figure 8.   Target for Recovery in YAFFS 
4. JFFS 
The log structure used in JFFS will affect the timing of when a page is marked 
obsolete by an update.  This log file may provide additional opportunities for the 
recovery of residual data.  An update to a file may not completely invalidate an old page.  
Take the following example:  200 bytes of “A” are written to the file at offset zero.  Then 
200 bytes of “B” are written to the file at offset 200.  Now, an update to the file is made 
by writing 50 bytes of “C” at offset 175.  This is an overwrite to the file at offset 175 
through 225.  But, the first two pages will not be invalidated because page one contains 
valid data for offsets 0 through 175, and page two contains valid data at 225 through 400.  
A page is not marked dirty until a later page completely invalidates an older page.  In the 
earlier example, if a user were to write 200 bytes of “C” at offset zero, then page one in 
the file would be marked as dirty.  Pages are written out sequentially to the flash device 
until it is filled.  At this point, a block will need to be reclaimed so new data may be 
written and the garbage collection process begins.  At this point, residual data will be at 
risk of being erased [19]. 
So there are two opportunities for residual data to exist on a flash memory device 
using a flash file system.  The first is when a page is not completely invalidated; as in the 
first example above.  The data that exists in just the areas invalidated by a future write 
will contain information related to older versions of the file.  Additionally, this page is 
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not subject to garbage collection, as it still contains valid data, and it will exist on the 
flash device for a longer time than if the page were invalidated. 
The second opportunity exists when a page is completely invalidated, but the head 
of the log has not yet reached the block containing the obsolete page.  Once the head of 
the log reaches this block, all valid pages will be written out to a clean block, and this 
dirty block will be erased.  The length of time the page remains on the flash device will 
depend upon usage.  A flash device utilizing JFFS, which has been written to minimally, 
will provide the best opportunity for the recovery of residual data. 
 
Figure 9.   Target for Recovery in JFFS 
Another versioning opportunity exists by examining the metadata stored with 
each page or node.  Each node stores the parent’s inode, file name and metadata in the 
flash page’s spare area.  By matching the parent inode of an obsolete page to a current in-
use inode, along with the file name, an earlier version of the file can be created by 
inserting the data at the appropriate offset.  In addition, MAC times stored with the node 
can also help in recreating timelines [19]. 
5. JFFS2 
The rework for JFFS2 slightly alters the opportunity to recover residual data.  All 
erase blocks will belong to one of three lists:  a clean list that contains all blocks that have 
only valid pages; a dirty list that contains all blocks with at least one dirty page; and a 
free list that contains all blocks that contain no data.  When a fresh block is needed to 
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write data, 99 times out of 100 the garbage collection process will choose a block from 
the dirty list to erase and the remaining times will choose a block from the clean list.  It is 
not a pure log system, but it may keep residual data on the flash slightly longer, as a 
block with valid data is subject to garbage collection 1 out of 100 times.  The versioning 
opportunity, for both pages remaining valid after an update and pages invalidated,  
remains the same as in JFFS and metadata still exists in the spare area.  The opportunity 
for recovery is greatest on systems that are used infrequently.  It is also important to note 
that JFFS2 uses a compression scheme, so any data recovered from the raw device will 
need to be uncompressed before it can be used [19]. 
B. EFFECTS OF FRAGMENTATION ON DATA RECOVERY 
After a flash device is filled for the first time, where the flash file system or FTL 
decides to write new data is no longer based upon location, but will depend on variables 
such as the number of dirty pages in a block, or a block’s erase count.  Whatever method 
is used, a file’s pages will no longer be grouped based upon spatial locality, causing files 
to become ever more fragmented as the flash is used.  This fragmentation has two 
impacts. 
The first impact is that larger files will become increasingly harder to recover, the 
more a flash device is used.  Although, logically, large video and picture files will seem 
to have very little fragmentation, if any at all, physically they will be saved throughout 
the flash device as pages become available.  The files will become ever more fragmented 
as they are altered by the user.  The best opportunity of recovery is of files that can fit 
within a single page, or files under 512 bytes, as carving files with multiple fragmentation 
points is difficult [35].  This may limit recoverable items to smaller text files and lower 
resolution images. 
The second implication of fragmentation is that it provides a signature for a flash 
device that has been used previously.  A hard disk drive may be wiped clean, then 




by the manufacturer.  But without physical layer access, any attempt by a user to wipe a 
flash memory device and then reformat it will still leave the device fragmented and might 
leave blocks that have not been garbage collected.   
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IV. RECOVERY EXPERIMENTS 
The following experiments test the theories of data recovery proposed in Chapter 
III.  They test the effects on flash memory of a deleted file, an overwritten file and the 
renaming of a file.  In addition, the effects of heavy usage on fragmentation is observed 
and how background processes, such as garbage collection and wear leveling may affect 
the forensic integrity of a device.  The following experiments were conducted on a Linux 
operating system and using a NAND flash simulator mounted with the YAFFS2 and 
JFFS2 file systems because of their relevance.  The FTL was not tested because we 
lacked the access to a physical device. 
A. PREPARATION OF SYSTEM 
The Ubuntu Linux kernel version 2.6.28 includes the JFFS2 file system. No 
further source code needed to be downloaded and included in the kernel source code; 
YAFFS2 is not included.  In addition, JFFS2 has compression enabled and does not 
support NAND flash by default.  To easily observe the effects of wear leveling 
techniques, JFFS2 needed to be reconfigured to turn the compression algorithms off.  
This allowed us to observe the effects JFFS2 had upon the physical layer, without having 
to research the compression algorithm and uncompress the data each time we took a 
physical layer image.  These modifications required the kernel to be recompiled.  We did 
not have access to a raw flash memory device (one without an FTL), so experiments were 
run using a simulated NAND flash device in RAM. 
The following steps were taken to prepare an Ubuntu operating system in a virtual 
environment using VMware Workstation 6.5.0: 
1. sudo apt-get install fakeroot kernel-package libncurses5-dev 
linux-source-2.6.28 installed the appropriate tools for configuring and building a 
kernel. 
2. sudo tar xvjf /usr/src/linux-source-2.6.28.tar.bz2 uncompressed 
the kernel source code. 
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3. CVS was downloaded and installed through the synaptic package manager. 
4. The YAFFS2 source code was downloaded and installed with export 
CVSROOT=:pserver:anonymous@cvs.aleph1.co.uk:/home/aleph1/cvs cvs logon 
and then cvs checkout yaffs2. 
5. A change in the source code was needed in order for the kernel to compile 
successfully.  Line 757 of file yaffs_fs.c from “pg = grab_cache_page(mapping, index);” 
was changed to “pg = __grab_cache_page(mapping, index);”. 
6. The YAFFS2 source code was copied to the appropriate location in the kernel 
source directory with sudo ./patch-ker.sh c /usr/src/linux-source-2.6.28/. 
7. The commands to compile the kernel were issued from the source code 
directory in /usr/src/linux-source-2.6.28/. 
8. The kernel configuration menu was launched with sudo make menuconfig. 
9. The “Files systems” option on the configuration menu was selected first. 
 Figure 10.   Kernel Configuration Step 9 
10. Next, “Miscellaneous filesystems” was selected. 
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 Figure 11.   Kernel Configuration Step 10 
11. “YAFFS2 file system support” was enabled. 
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 Figure 12.   Kernel Configuration Step 11 
12. The “Lets Yaffs do its own ECC” option was selected. 
13. “Cache short names in RAM” was deselected. 
14. Then, to configure JFFS2, “JFFS2 ZLIB compression support”, “JFFS2 LZO 
compression support” and “JFFS2 RTIME compression support” were deselected under 
“Journalling Flash File System v2 (JFFS2) support”.  “JFFS2 write-buffering support” 
was left selected to provide NAND support for JFFS2. 
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 Figure 13.   Kernel Configuration Step 14 
15. “JFFS2 default compression mode (priority)” was selected and then “no 
compression” was selected to disable all compression. 
 
Figure 14.   Kernel Configuration Step 15 
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16. These settings were saved and the Configuration menu was exited. 
17. To clean the source tree and reset the kernel-package parameters sudo make-
kpkg clean command was run. 
18. sudo fakeroot make-kpkg --initrd --revision=custom.1.0 
kernel_image compiled the kernel. 
19. sudo dpkg -i ../linux-image-2.6.28.9_custom.1.0_i386.deb 
installed the new kernel. 
20. sudo shutdown -r now rebooted the system and the new kernel loaded. 
The steps to mount a JFFS2 and YAFFS2 file system onto the simulated devices 
were: 
1. The mtd-utils package was downloaded with the Synaptic Package Manager.  
MTD utilities are a collection of tools that allow the user to interact with the MTD 
subsystem in the kernel to perform operations on Flash devices. 
2. Two directories, one for JFFS2 and one for YAFFS2 to mount, were created.  
/mnt/nandyaffs and /mnt/nandjffs were used for these experiments. 
3. sudo modprobe mtd, modprobe jffs2, modprobe mtdchar and modprobe 
mtdblock loaded the appropriate tools to use the mtd subsystem.  sudo modprobe 
nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0x33 created an mtd device of size 
16MB, simulating a NAND flash device in RAM.  mtdram and mtd2block can also be 
used to simulate a flash device, but these tools simulate NOR flash. 
B. EXPERIMENTS 
Each experiment was conducted on a NAND flash simulator mounted with JFFS2 
and with YAFFS2.  All experiments began with a blank file system.  This was achieved 
by dismounting the mtdblock device after each experiment and then erasing the entire 
device.  At the start of each experiment, the simulated flash device is mounted for the 
first time.  The YAFFS2 and JFFS2 file systems were mounted on a 16MB device with 
512 byte pages, 16KB erase blocks and 16 bytes of spare area.  The results of the 
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experiments were observed by retrieving the data off of the mtd device, with the 
nanddump command, to an image file and observing the file with the hex editor hexedit.  
dd, dcfldd and mtd_debug read could all have been used to retrieve data from the mtd 
device, but nanddump gave the option to also retrieve spare area information, which best 
simulated a physical layer memory dump of a flash memory device.  The command sudo 
apt-get install hexedit downloaded and installed hexedit.  mount -t jffs2 
/dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs mounted the mtd0 device with the JFFS2 file system 
and mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandyaffs mounted the mtd0 device 
with the YAFFS2 file system.  All experiments were conducted using Python 2.6 
programs. 
1. Test the Ability to Write and Read from a Simulated NAND Device 
The experiment: 
 The simulated flash device was mounted. 
 A 512 byte file, beginning with the phrase “NPS Beginning of a page” and 
ending with the phrase “NPS End of a page”, was written to the flash 
device. 
 The device was unmounted. 
 The entire contents of the flash device were read and saved to an external 
file in order to be observed later. 
 The flash device was completely erased so that a clean file system was 
ready for the next experiment. 
The results: 
The entire file containing the flag word “NPS” was recovered in both the 
YAFFS2 and JFFS2 mounted devices.  The file was recovered on the YAFFS2 file 
system at byte offset 0x00.  The first page was the original object header, written when 
the file was first created.  It contained the file name and the size of the file when it was 
first created, which was zero.  The second page contained updated object header metadata 
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such as user id, group id and Modified/Access/Create times.  This was followed by the 
file’s data and then the fourth page, which contained another updated object header, to 
include the new length of the file after the data was written to flash.  YAFFS2 writes the 
name “silly old name” when updating object header metadata such as user id and group 
id.  This “silly old name” operation updates far more metadata than the update operation 
that resulted in the write of the fourth page.  In the following figures, the red lines outline 
one data page, while the blue lines outline one spare area, which corresponds to the data 
page immediately preceding it. 
 Figure 15.   YAFFS2 Recovered File 
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The file on the JFFS2 file system was recovered at byte offset 0x1077BE8 and 
used two pages for both data and metadata.  Metadata was stored at the beginning and the 
end of the file and the file’s data crossed a page boundary. 
 
Figure 16.   JFFS2 Recovered File 
2. Effects of Renaming a File 
The experiment: 
 The flash device was mounted. 
 A 512 byte file named “file1”, beginning with the phrase “NPS Beginning 
of a page” and ending with the phrase “NPS End of a page”, was written 
to the flash device.  
 The device was unmounted and the entire contents of the flash device 
were read and saved to an external file.   
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 The flash device was then mounted again and the file was renamed from 
“file1” to “file2” 
 The device was unmounted and the entire contents of the flash device 
were read and saved to second external file.   
 The flash device was then completely erased. 
The results: 
With the YAFFS2 file system, the file was recovered at byte offset 0x00.  Similar 
to experiment 1, the first page contained the original file name and file size at the time the 
file was created.  The second page contained the updated file header info.  The third page 
contained the file’s data and the fourth page was an updated object header page 
containing the file name and new size.  After the file was renamed, two additional pages 
were written to the flash device immediately following the first four pages, while the 
outdated header pages remained on the flash.  The two new pages were written when the 
file was first touched and then when the filename was changed.  The first new page 
contained updated object header metadata, writing the new MAC times and then 
rewriting information such as user id and group ids.  The second page contained the new 
filename and another update to the MAC times.  In the following image, each red block is 
a flash page and the subsequent blue block is its spare area. 
 Figure 17.   YAFFS2 Effects of Rename Operation 
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With the JFFS2 file system, the original file occupied two pages with header 
metadata and file data mixed into the same pages beginning at offset 0x1067400.  The 
first page begins with metadata and the file data spanned both pages.  After the rename 
operation, a third page was appended to the first two, containing the new header 
metadata, including the new filename, while the out versioned file header remained on 
the flash.  In the following image, the red blocks represent one flash page and the blue 
blocks represent its associated spare area. 
 
 





3. Effects of Deleting a File 
The experiment: 
 The flash device was mounted; a 512 byte file named “file1”, beginning 
with the phrase “NPS Beginning of a page” and ending with the phrase 
“NPS End of a page”, was written to the flash device. 
 The device was unmounted in order to flush the buffer and the entire 
contents of the flash device were read and saved to an external file.   
 The flash device was then mounted again and the file was deleted.   
 The device was unmounted and the entire contents of the flash device 
were read and saved to a second external file.   
 The flash device was then completely erased. 
The results: 
With the YAFFS2 file system, the results were similar to a rename operation.  
Two new pages were written containing object header updates.   The difference was in 
the second new page written as a result of the rename operation.  After the file was 
deleted, the second updated header page contained a new filename, “unlinked,” updated 
MAC times, with the user id, group id and other object metadata set to zero and the size 
of the file reset back to zero.  The original file remained on the flash device, unaltered. 
 
Figure 19.   YAFFS2 Effects of a Delete 
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With the JFFS2 file system, the original file occupied two pages with header 
metadata and file data mixed into the same pages beginning at offset 0x1046400.  The 
first page began with metadata and the file’s data spanned both pages.  After the file was 
deleted, a third page was written to the flash device containing updated inode 
information, meant to replace the original.  The original file data, along with its metadata 









4. Effects of a Partial Overwrite 
The experiment: 
 The flash device was mounted. 
 A 512 byte file named “file1”, beginning with the phrase “NPS Beginning 
of a page” and ending with the phrase “NPS End of a page”,  was written 
to the flash device. 
 The device was unmounted in order to flush the buffer and the entire 
contents of the flash device were read and saved to an external file.   
 The flash device was mounted again and 50 bytes of the file, at an offset 
250 bytes into the file were overwritten, changing 50 ASCII “A”s to 50 
ASCII “Z”s.  This was accomplished through the dd command.   
 The device was then unmounted and the entire contents of the flash device 
were read and saved to a second external file. 
 The flash device was then completely erased. 
The results: 
With the YAFFS2 file system, after the partial overwrite, two new pages were 
written to the flash.  The first page contained the entirety of the updated file’s data, 
including both the overwritten portion and the data that was not altered.  A second page 
was written containing updated object header metadata including MAC times and file 
length, but not the robust object header update seen when “silly old name” is written.  
The original file remained on the device unaltered. 
 
Figure 21.   YAFFS2 Effects of a Partial Overwrite 
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With the JFFS2 file system, the new data alone was written to a new page, along 
with its metadata, after the original file.  When the file system reads this file, it will 
overwrite the original file with the updated data at the appropriate offset into the file.  
The original file remained on the flash device, unaltered. 
 
 
Figure 22.   JFFS2 Effects of a Partial Overwrite 
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5. Effects of a Complete Overwrite 
The experiment: 
 The flash device was mounted. 
 A 512 byte file named “file1”, beginning with the phrase “NPS Beginning 
of a page” and ending with the phrase “NPS End of a page”,  was written 
to the flash device. 
 The device was unmounted in order to flush the buffer and the entire 
contents of the flash device were read and saved to an external file.   
 The flash device was mounted again and 512 bytes of the file, at an offset 
0 bytes into the file were overwritten, changing all file contents to 512 
ASCII “Z”s.  This was accomplished through the dd command.   
 The device was then unmounted and the entire contents of the flash device 
were read and saved to a second external file.   
 The flash device was then completely erased. 
The results: 
With the YAFFS2 file system, after a complete overwrite, two new pages were 
written to the flash.  The first page contained the entirety of the updated file’s data, while 
the second page written contained the updated object header metadata including MAC 
times and file length, but not the robust object header update seen when “silly old name” 
is written.  The original file remained on the device unaltered. 
 
Figure 23.   YAFFS2 Effects of a Complete Overwrite 
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With the JFFS2 file system, the new data was written over two new pages, along 
with updated metadata, after the original file.  The original file remained on the flash 
device, unaltered. 
 
Figure 24.   JFFS2 Effects of a Complete Overwrite 
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6. Is One File Big Enough to Sanitize? 
This experiment tests the hypothesis that, if a file the size of the flash device is 
written, it will successfully sanitize the device of all previously saved data. 
The experiment: 
 The flash device was mounted. 
 A 512 byte file named “file1”, beginning with the phrase “NPS Beginning 
of a page” and ending with the phrase “NPS End of a page”, was written 
to the flash device and the device was unmounted in order to flush the 
buffer.   
 The flash device was then mounted again and “file1” was erased.   
 The device was then unmounted and the entire contents of the flash device 
were read and saved to an external file.   
 The device was mounted again and a 16MB file, containing all zeros and 
named “file2” was written to the device, with the dd command and a block 
size of 512 bytes.   
 The device was unmounted again, to flush the buffer and the contents of 
the file were read and saved to a second external file.   
 The device was then remounted and “file2” was deleted. 
 The device was unmounted again and the contents were read and saved to 
a third external file.   
 The flash device was then completely erased. 
In both the YAFFS2 and JFFS2 file systems, no traces of the original file were 
recovered.  The image obtained after “file2” was deleted was then compared to a clean 
image of the flash device.  YAFFS2 erased all but 4 blocks after “file2” was deleted.  




delete operation, including the effects of updates to header objects, some residual file 
data along with its out of band data, the “silly old name” string and the “unlinked” string.  
The filename, “file2”, was not recoverable. 
With JFFS2, there were nine blocks that were not erased as part of deleting 
“file2”.  Those nine blocks contained file data and JFFS2 metadata.  In addition, the 
filename “file2” was also recovered.  When compared to a clean JFFS2 file image, these 
nine blocks of data showed evidence of a sanitization attempt.  The remaining blocks that 
were successfully erased contained clean markers, which are also on the clean JFFS2 
image.  JFFS2 uses clean markers to ensure a block erase operation was correctly 
completed and blocks are safe to store information. 
7. Background Processes Effect on Forensic Integrity 
This experiment determines whether background process, such as garbage 
collection and wear leveling, will have an effect on the forensic integrity of a flash 
device, when there has been no change to user data. 
The experiment: 
 An image was taken of a clean, erased device. 
 The device was mounted, unmounted and another image was taken.   
 The device was mounted again.  
 The program running the experiment slept for 60 seconds and then the 
device was unmounted.   
 A third image was taken and the flash device was erased.   
 An md5 sum was computed of all three images and the results were 




All three hash totals computed on the YAFFS2 file system were the same.  For the 
JFFS2 file system, the first hash total computed on the clean device was different than the 
second and third.  The second hash total and the third (calculated after the 60-second 
sleep operation) were the same.  The difference between the first image and the second 
was due to clean markers written to each erase block. 
8. The Effects of Heavy Usage on Fragmentation 
This experiment tests whether a file written to a flash memory device that is 
heavily used will be fragmented at the physical layer.  A fragmented file will not impact 
performance, but it will complicate forensic recovery. 
The benchmarking program, PostMark, was used to simulate a heavily-used flash 
memory device found in the field.  PostMark was designed to create a large pool of 
continually changing files, and to measure the transaction rates for a workload 
approximating a large Internet electronic mail server.  PostMark generates an initial pool 
of random text files ranging in size from a configurable low bound to a configurable high 
bound. This file pool is of configurable size and can be located on any accessible file 
system.  Once the pool has been created, a specified number of transactions occurs. Each 
transaction consists of a pair of smaller transactions: create a file or delete a file; read a 
file or append to a file [36].   
The experiment was conducted on each file system twice.  The difference 
between the two experiments was the number of files deleted after PostMark completed, 
in order to free memory so a new file could be created.  The first experiment deletes a 
small number of files at the logical level in order to create a new file; the second deletes 
all files created by PostMark.  The PostMark source code was altered so that it did not 
delete any files when the benchmarking completed.  This gave us more control over the 
amount of space used on the device when we wrote a new file.  The two experiments 
were run because of significantly different results observed in YAFFS2.  For all 
experiments, there were 1,000 simultaneous files, ranging from 500 bytes to 10KB, and 
50,000 transactions performed. 
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Experiment version one: 
 The device was mounted and the postmark benchmarking program was 
run.   
 The device was unmounted to flush the buffer and then remounted.   
 93KB of data was deleted to make room for a new file.   
 The device was unmounted and an image was acquired.   
 The device was mounted, a 50KB file was written, and the device was 
unmounted.   
 A second image was taken and the flash device was erased. 
The results: 
 The file was recovered from the YAFFS2 flash device with six 
fragmentation points.   
 The file was recovered from the JFFS2 flash device with two 
fragmentation points. 
Experiment version two: 
 The device was mounted and the postmark benchmarking program was 
run.   
 The device was unmounted to flush the buffer and then mounted.   
 Then all files were deleted to make room for a new file.   
 The device was unmounted and an image was acquired.   
 The device was mounted, a 50KB file was written, and the device was 
unmounted.   





The results were significantly different for the YAFFS2 device when all the files 
were deleted.  YAFFS2 performed a large amount of garbage collection.  All but one 
block was erased.  This resulted in a file that was not fragmented.  The block that was not 
garbage collected contained a small amount of residual data from the deleted files.  In 
particular, the pages held updated header object information, including the strings 
“unlinked” and “silly old name,” but not file names. 
JFFS2 did not perform as radical a garbage collection operation as YAFFS2.  The 










V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Flash memory devices are popular worldwide and include cell phones, mp3 
players, SD cards, digital cameras and solid-state hard drives.  Tools used today to 
analyze these devices treat flash memory much like a hard disk drive.  The physical 
differences between hard disk drives and flash memory require forensic tools that are 
specifically designed to address flash memory.   
The write once limitation of flash memory requires file changes to be stored in a 
different physical location.  Also, wear leveling algorithms are implemented to prohibit 
flash memory blocks that contain frequently-altered data from going bad more quickly 
than those that hold static data.  There are two methods to address these requirements: a 
flash file system and the Flash Transition Layer (FTL).  The FTL allows flash devices to 
be used with unmodified legacy operating systems.  It introduces a logical layer above 
the physical layer that hides the details of flash management from the operating system.  
USB thumb drives and SD cards utilize an FTL.  A flash file system provides better 
utilization of flash storage at a somewhat higher cost.  Two examples of flash file systems 
are YAFFS, which is used in Google’s Android, and JFFS2, used in the OLPC program.  
The FTL and flash file system solutions both provide an opportunity to recover old data 
and metadata after a file is changed or deleted, and the new information is written to a 
new physical location. 
This thesis contributed the following to the field of computer forensics: 
 The first comprehensive survey of the academic literature regarding flash 
forensics. 
 Thorough review of the FTL, flash file systems and flash memory patents 
with respect to the opportunities for recovering residual data. 
 Clearly documented steps for configuring Linux to use YAFFS and JFFS2 
with a flash simulator. 
 Experiments which used a flash simulator and file system operations to 
determine residual data left by YAFFS and JFFS2. 
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 Discussed the possibilities for recovering residual data from the FTL. 
Through the use of the YAFFS and JFFS2 file systems and a NAND flash 
simulator on a Linux operating system, we: 
 Successfully recovered a deleted file. 
 Successfully recovered a partially and a completely overwritten file. 
 Successfully recovered the previous name of a file that was renamed.   
 Determined that the background processes of YAFFS and JFFS2, such as 
garbage collection and wear leveling, did not affect the forensic integrity 
of the flash memory.  
 Determined that writing one large file, the size of the flash memory 
device, was sufficient for sanitization purposes.  But, evidence remained 
of the sanitization attempt, even after the file was deleted. 
 Confirmed that a heavily used and practically full flash memory device 
resulted in a newly written file to have multiple fragmentation points, 
complicating file carving attempts.  But with the use of YAFFS, the result 
of deleting all the files in order to free up room, triggered a large garbage 
collection procedure that erased all but one block, leaving newly created 
files unfragmented and decreasing the potential to recover old data.  This 
was most likely caused by all of the pages in these blocks being marked 
as dirty, which prompted the garbage collection process. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The recovery experiments were performed on clean devices with easily 
identifiable text.  The data stored in the spare area relates the data in flash pages with its 
file.  The spare area information allows the flash file systems and FTL to recreate the 
files on demand.  Research that leads to a better understanding of how the information in 
the spare area identifies which file the data belongs will help in improving file carving 
techniques and data recovery attempts. 
While we were able to determine that one large file was sufficient to sanitize a 
16MB simulated device, we were not able to verify the effects of blocks gone bad in 
simulation.  The FTL and flash file systems will mark blocks as bad after they can no 
longer be programmed correctly.  Bad blocks may contain residual data that cannot be 
erased [37].  Additional research is needed to determine how the FTL and flash file 
systems treat bad blocks and whether there is potential for residual data. 
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The deletion of all the files stored on a full memory device in experiment eight 
(the effects of heavy usage on fragmentation) caused a large garbage collection that hurt 
the potential to recover residual data.  Understanding when the FTL and flash file 
systems conduct garbage collection will help the forensic investigator understand how 
long residual data may exist on a seized flash memory device. 
These experiments were conducted on a flash simulator because we did not have 
access to raw flash memory, and it allowed us to impose control on the tests.  The use of 
the simulator hindered our ability to observe the effects of the FTL on flash memory.  
Research on devices such as USB thumb drives and SD cards will be able to test our 
proposed theories on residual data created by the FTL, while research on devices that use 
flash file systems (such as the T-Mobile G1) will provide confidence that the experiments 
translate well to the field. 
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APPENDIX 
A. PYTHON CODE FOR EXPERIMENTS 
1. YAFFS Experiment 1 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 '+ 
'/dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment1Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
2. YAFFS Experiment 2 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands, os 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment2Image') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment2ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
3. YAFFS Experiment 3 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment3Image') 





commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment3ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
4. YAFFS Experiment 4 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment4Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('dd if=/mnt/Z of=/mnt/nandyaffs/file1 obs=50 
ibs=50 seek=5 count=1 conv=notrunc')  #/mnt/Z is a file containing 50 
ASCII “Z” 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment4ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
5. YAFFS Experiment 5 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment7Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 
/mnt/nandyaffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('dd if=/mnt/Z3 of=/mnt/nandyaffs/file1 obs=512 
ibs=512 count=1 conv=notrunc') #/mnt/Z3 is a file containing 512 ASCII 
“Z” 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment7ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
6. YAFFS Experiment 6 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment5Virgin') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment5Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/nandyaffs/file2 bs=512 
count=32768') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment5ImageAfterSanitization') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment5ImageAfterDeleteFile2') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
7. YAFFS Experiment 7 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands, time 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6Image1') 
commands.getstatusoutput('md5sum -b '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6Image1 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6MD5Sums') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('sudo umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6Image2') 
commands.getstatusoutput('md5sum -b '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6Image2 >> '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6MD5Sums') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
time.sleep(60) 
commands.getstatusoutput('sudo umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6Image3') 
commands.getstatusoutput('md5sum -b '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6Image3  >> '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment6MD5Sums') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
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commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm -rf /mnt/nandyaffs/26*') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment8Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
for x in range(0,97): 
 f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
 f.write('A'*473) 
 f.write('End of a page NPS') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment8ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 




commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm -rf /mnt/nandyaffs/*') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment8aImage') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t yaffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 '+ 
'/mnt/nandyaffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandyaffs/file1', 'wb') 
for x in range(0,97): 
 f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
 f.write('A'*473) 
 f.write('End of a page NPS') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/yaffsexp/experiment8aImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
10. JFFS2 Experiment 1 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment1Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
11. JFFS2 Experiment 2 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands, os 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment2Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
os.rename('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', '/mnt/nandjffs/file2') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment2ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
12. JFFS2 Experiment 3 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment3Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm /mnt/nandjffs/file1') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment3ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
13. JFFS2 Experiment 4 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment4Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
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commands.getstatusoutput('dd if=/mnt/Z of=/mnt/nandjffs/file1 obs=50 
ibs=50 seek=5 count=1 conv=notrunc') #/mnt/Z is a file containing 50 
ASCII “Z” 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment4ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
14. JFFS2 Experiment 5 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment7Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('dd if=/mnt/Z3 of=/mnt/nandjffs/file1 obs=512 
ibs=512 count=1 conv=notrunc') #/mnt/Z3 is a file containing 512 ASCII 
“Z” 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment7ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
15. JFFS2 Experiment 6 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment5Virgin') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
f.write('End of a page NPS') 
f.close() 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm /mnt/nandjffs/file1') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment5Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/nandjffs/file2 bs=512 
count=32768') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment5ImageAfterSanitization') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm /mnt/nandjffs/file2') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment5ImageAfterDeleteFile2') 
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commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
16. JFFS2 Experiment 7 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import commands, time 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6Image1') 
commands.getstatusoutput('md5sum -b '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6Image1 > 
/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6MD5Sums') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('sudo umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > 
/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6Image2') 
commands.getstatusoutput('md5sum -b '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6Image2 >> '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6MD5Sums') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
time.sleep(60) 
commands.getstatusoutput('sudo umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6Image3') 
commands.getstatusoutput('md5sum -b '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6Image3  >> '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment6MD5Sums') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
 




commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm -rf /mnt/nandjffs/26*') 
commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment8Image') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
for x in range(0,97): 
 f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
 f.write('End of a page NPS') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment8ImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 




commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
commands.getstatusoutput('rm -rf /mnt/nandjffs/*') 
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commands.getstatusoutput('umount /dev/mtdblock0') 
commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment8aImage') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/nandjffs') 
f = open('/mnt/nandjffs/file1', 'wb') 
for x in range(0,97): 
 f.write('NPS Beginning of a page') 
f.write('A'*473) 
 f.write('End of a page NPS') 




commands.getstatusoutput('nanddump /dev/mtd0 > '+ 
'/home/user/Desktop/jffsexp/experiment8aImageA') 
commands.getstatusoutput('mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd0 0 16777216') 
B. LINUX IMAGE README 
This is the linux kernel image we used to run our experiments for the thesis "The Forensic Potential of 
Flash Memory" 
The username is: user 
The password is: password 
The kernel has been recompiled to include the YAFFS2 and JFFS2 with no compression and NAND 
support 
The following functionality has also been loaded: 
- libncurses5 (needed to recompile the kernel) 
- kernel-package (needed to recompile the kernel) 
- linux source code 2.6.28 (needed to recompile the kernel) 
- YAFFS2 (The source code is in the home directory) 
- mtd-utils 
- hexedit hex editor 
- PostMark benchmarking program (The original tarball and the altered source code are in the 
home directory) 
- The mtd, jffs2, mtdchar and mtdblock modules have been loaded (If you restart the system, these 
will need to be reloaded) 
- A clean 16MB simulated flash device with 512 byte pages and 16Kb erase block on mtd0. (If 
you restart the system, this simulated device will need to be recreated) 
The python programs used to run the experiments are on the Desktop in the yaffsexp and jffsexp directories 
The directories used to mount the simulated flash device have been created and are located at: 
- /mnt/nandjffs 
- /mnt/nandyaffs 
If you find any sensitive/private information, please remove and contact us at: jaregan@nps.edu or 
slgarfin@nps.edu 
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